I examine the role of word of mouth in consumer's product discovery process and its implications for the rm. A monopolist supplies an assortment of horizontally dierentiated products and consumers search for a product that matches their taste by sampling products from the assortment or by seeking product recommendations from other consumers. I analyze the underlying consumer interactions that lead to the emergence of word of mouth, examine the optimal pricing and assortment strategy of the rm, and explain the impact of word of mouth on the concentration of sales within the assortment. The model provides a rationale for the long tail phenomenon, explains recent empirical ndings in online retail, and is well suited for product categories such as music, lm, books, and video game entertainment.
Introduction
Word of mouth is fundamental to the product discovery process of consumers. In product categories such as music, lm, books, or video games, consumers often identify products that match their taste through the recommendations of others. And with the expansion of electronic commerce, consumers are increasingly accessing these recommendations online. Retailers have embraced the transition by hosting consumer word of mouth on their websites, inviting consumer feedback about products and displaying it on their product pages. Moreover, retailers are exploiting such feedback to generate personalized product recommendations for their customers. The online retail environment has therefore become an important venue for consumers to obtain product recommendations.
Consider how Amazon exploits product recommendations to foster product discovery. A new customer visiting Amazon.com is presented with bestselling products on the storefront and invited to sign in to see personalized recommendations. Once the customer has created an account and signed in, the storefront is updated to list product recommendations prominently under headings such as recommendations for you, related to items you've viewed, inspired by your shopping trends, customers who bought items in your recent history also bought, and so on. Similarly, visiting a product page will list related product recommendations under what other items do customers buy after viewing this item? and customers who bought this item also bought. These product recommendations are generated by an automated recommender system, which exploits Amazon's large stock of consumer feedback to identify potential matches between customers and products. Customers who may have otherwise resorted to oine word of mouth, seeking product recommendations from others within their social circles, can now readily access an almost endless supply of them through Amazon's algorithms.
This paper presents a model of consumer search to explain the impact of product recommendations on consumer product discovery and the concentration of sales. The model explains the rm's incentives to increase the eciency of word of mouth: to lower the cost for consumers to access product recommendations and to improve the matching between consumers and the products they are recommended. The model also explains the consequences of such improvements for consumers and for the concentration of sales within the rm's assortment. Both are intrinsically linked. When consumers with more prevalent preferences are the main beneciaries of the eciency improvements, the concentration of sales increases generating a superstar eect. This increases the performance of bestselling products. When consumers with less prevalent preferences are the main beneciaries, as empirical evidence suggests is the case with the recent expansion of electronic commerce, the concentration of sales is reduced generating a long tail eect. As a result, products representing a small share of total sales (located in the tail of the sales distribution) perform better in the online channel, as rst noted by Anderson (2004) . The model reconciles lower sales concentration in online retail with the rm's logic for prot maximization, and informs the design of marketing strategies to exploit consumer word of mouth.
The intuition for the long tail result can be outlined with an example. A large share of the consumer population has mainstream preferences, and a smaller share has niche preferences.
Other factors equal, oine word of mouth tends to benet mainstream consumers the most, because product recommendations more often originate from consumers with mainstream preferences. This drives mainstream consumers to participate more in the market, which increases the sales of products preferred by mainstream consumers in the oine environment. What happens when the word of mouth process moves online and improves its eciency? This levels the playing eld across consumers, beneting those with niche preferences the most. As a result, niche consumers participate more and this increases the sales of their preferred products in the online environment, reducing the concentration of sales and generating a long tail eect.
The example oversimplies the problem, of course. Consumer search strategies and product prices are jointly determined by the interactions that arise in the marketplace. On the one hand, niche consumers are not dependent on word of mouth to discover products. They can resort to searching the assortment to discover products that match their taste. On the other hand, the rm will account for the fact that mainstream consumers benet more from word of mouth when pricing products, and higher prices can overturn their advantage. The modeling exercise presented below formalizes these aspects of the problem, endogenizing consumer search strategies and product prices, and shows that the long tail eect continues to hold.
Literature
To the best of my knowledge, no previous theoretical work has explored the links between word of mouth and sales concentration. Recent literature contributions have explored how changes in consumer search trigger supply-side shifts that aect the concentration of sales. Bar-Isaac, Caruana and Cuñat (2012) model how reductions in consumer search costs aect product design choices on the supply side of the market, which can lead to lower sales concentration by increasing the market shares of rms with rare designs. Yang (2013) analyzes how consumer search costs and targetability aects product variety, and shows that improvements in search can lower the concentration of sales by ensuring less popular product varieties are produced by rms. These contributions provide important insights on how consumer search aects the variety of products supplied in the market, and therefore the concentration of sales.
Recent empirical evidence suggests that factors beyond the variety of products supplied are contributing to lower sales concentration online. Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Simester (2011) examine sales concentration within the assortment of a multi-channel clothing retailer and nd that, even when supply-side factors such as product availability and visibility are held constant, the Internet channel exhibits signicantly less concentration than the catalog channel. Elberse and OberholzerGee (2008) report similar ndings comparing the oine and online sales of a large sample of DVD and VHS video titles. This paper shows that improvements in the eciency of word of mouth, for instance driven by recommender systems, can explain these ndings.
The empirical literature has also shown that facilitating word of mouth and personalized product recommendations has a positive impact on sales, consistent with the ndings derived below. Recent contributions also nd that niche consumers benet the most from online word of mouth.
Feng and Zhang (2010) show that online consumer reviews of video games have a stronger impact on niche products. Tan and Netessine (2011) examine the supply of new titles on Netix and conclude that recommender systems play an important role in guiding niche consumers to discover new releases. Sun (2011) shows that product ratings are more informative for niche consumers when presented together with the variance of ratings, as is frequently the case in online retail.
Choi and Bell (2011) argue that e-commerce attracts preference minorities who are not well served by brick and mortar stores due to the constraints of physical distribution.
1.2
A search framework for word of mouth I build on the modeling foundation for consumer search with dierentiated products developed by Wolinsky (1986) and extended by Anderson and Renault (1999) . Consumers arrive to the market uninformed about products. Each consumer can become informed by sequentially drawing products from the assortment, incurring a search cost on each product draw and observing the price and the utility derived from the product. Consumers form a correct expectation of the value of search and decide whether participate or not in the market. I focus on the monopoly case where all products are supplied by a single rm, so consumers search across the rm's assortment.
1
The modeling foundation assumes that consumers observe product price and product utility 1 Search costs can be interpreted as the costs of acquiring information in the market. A consumer with zero search cost (consumer s i = 0 in the model) incurs no positive cost to observe the price and the utility derived from all products. Note that if all consumers had zero search costs, the outcome is equivalent to the case where consumers are perfectly informed about the assortment. In this case all products are priced at u, all consumers purchase, and no word of mouth arises because consumers do not benet from product recommendations.
simultaneously on each draw. This keeps the analysis simple by ensuring consumers do not infer product utility based on product price, or vice versa. For example, if consumers could observe product prices before searching given that product prices are more salient than product utility in many retail contexts they could use this information to infer product utility without engaging in search (if the rm sets a dierent price for each product type in equilibrium). The assumption rules out the possibility that the rm uses prices as a signaling device to reduce consumer search costs, which is reasonable for categories where products are horizontally dierentiated such as music, lms, books, or video games. In these categories, consumer preferences are highly idiosyncratic and prices tend to be a weak predictor of the utility of products.
2
I consider two product types and two consumer types in the model, which simplies the analysis though the results extend to a larger number of types. I enrich consumer search by letting consumers choose among two alternative search strategies: they can search the assortment by sampling products directly (as in standard search models) or they can search with word of mouth by seeking product recommendations. The odds when drawing from the assortment will depend on the assortment's product composition, and the odds when drawing recommendations will depend on the composition of consumers who provide them. Assortment search takes place rst, so consumers who search the assortment become the providers of recommendations in the market. The richness of the setup originates from the interdependencies that arise with word of mouth: if more consumers of a given type search the assortment, consumers of that type will benet more from drawing recommendations. This implies that the utility consumers derive from word of mouth is endogenously determined in equilibrium, and will depend on the search strategy choices across the whole consumer population.
The motivation for this approach is twofold. First, it addresses the chicken-and-egg problem of how consumers become informed about products in order to provide recommendations to others.
Clearly, some consumers have to explore the assortment rst for others to benet from informed recommendations, so incorporating assortment search into the problem explicitly accounts for this process. And second, it allows the model to explain the emergence of word of mouth and the composition of consumers who participate in it. Given that consumers can search the assortment or stay out of the market instead of searching with word of mouth, they will only do so if it pays o.
The eciency of word of mouth in the model hinges on two factors: the cost for consumers to obtain product recommendations and the degree of preference matching in the process, which 2 When products are vertically dierentiated, standard models predict that price and quality are positively correlated. For example, if smartphones can be ranked according to technical specications and consumers agree that these specications are the relevant dimension of dierentiation in this product category, then consumers can correctly infer that a high-price smartphone will yield higher utility than a low-price smartphone. In models of horizontal dierentiation, in contrast, prices are not informative of the utility provided by products. High-price products can yield lower utility than low-price products to some consumers. For example, it can be argued that the retail price of a book is a poor predictor of the utility it will provide to a reader. The analysis is therefore better suited to product categories where the horizontal dierentiation dimension prevails.
increases the likelihood that consumers are recommended one of their preferred products. This allows the model to encompass recommender systems in the context of online retail as well as traditional word of mouth exchanges in the oine context. In the online environment, the cost of recommendations is low because recommender systems readily supply recommendations on demand. In the oine environment, the cost of recommendations is higher because consumers need to engage in social interactions to obtain them. The degree of preference matching is high in the online context because recommender systems match consumers based on their product preferences, increasing the likelihood of successful recommendations.
3 In the oine context there is no matching mechanism intermediating the exchange, so preference matching tends to be lower.
Nonetheless, consumers can seek to interact with those who provided successful recommendations in the past, so the degree of matching in the oine context will increase with consumer's awareness of the product preferences of others (i.e., with the observability of consumption patterns or opportunities for joint consumption). 4 The recommender's task is simplied when the target audience becomes more homogeneous because this reduces the variance in the success rate of product recommendations across consumers. Nonetheless, market congurations where only one consumer type searches with word of mouth are more relevant to the oine context. The analysis reveals that both consumer types have strong incentives to seek product recommendations when preference matching τ is high and recommendation cost w is low, as is the case in the presence of a recommender system. 
The model
Consider a market where a monopolist supplies a product assortment consisting of a continuum of products of measure one. There is a unit mass of consumers who dier in their product preferences and in their search costs. The simplest instance of the model that yields the results is that where there are two types of products over which consumers exhibit a strict preference ranking. To this end, I partition the assortment into two product types and consider two consumer types. A share a of products in the assortment is of type 1, and the remaining share 1 − a is of type 2. Similarly, there is a share m of consumers of type 1 and there is a share 1 − m of consumers of type 2. All consumers derive utility u from products of their same type and zero utility from the remaining.
The problem is of interest when the shares of both types dier across consumers and products.
, 1) so that consumers of type 1 are more prevalent in the population, so I will refer to consumers of type 1 as mainstream consumers and to consumers of type 2 as niche consumers.
Similarly, let a ∈ (
, 1) so that products of type 1 are more prevalent (or prominent) in the assortment. I will refer to products of type 1 that appeal to mainstream consumers as mainstream products, and to products of type 2 as niche products.
Consumers face a search problem. They do not observe the utility and the price of individual products when arriving to the market, so all products appear ex-ante identical. Consumers need to search in order to identify which products are of their preferred type and observe their prices.
Consumers exhibit unit demand, and may participate in the market to search for and purchase one of their preferred products or stay out. A product match is achieved when a preferred product is identied. Consumers can locate a match either by searching the assortment or by searching with word of mouth.
The timing of the game is as follows. In the rst stage, the rm sets prices p 1 and p 2 for mainstream and niche products, respectively. In the second stage, consumers may search the assortment by sequentially drawing products. Consumers draw products randomly from the assortment to sample them, and learn the utility they provide and observe their price. If a draw yields a match (the product is of the same type as the consumer and yields utility u), the consumer purchases the product and exits the market. Otherwise, the consumer continues to draw products until a match is located.
In the third stage, consumers may search with word of mouth by sequentially drawing product recommendations. These recommendations are provided by consumers who searched the assort- Table 1 : Key notation used in the paper ment in the second stage, who recommend the product they matched with to others. Alternatively, recommendations can be interpreted to be provided by a recommender system, which intermediates between consumers drawing recommendations and consumers who searched the assortment (who provide input to the algorithm). Each recommendation enables the consumer to learn the utility derived from the recommended product and observe its price. If this results in a match, the consumer purchases the product and exits the market. Otherwise the consumer continues to draw recommendations until a match is located.
I model the supply and demand of product recommendations with a pull-based process (see the preceding section for a discussion of the setup). When mainstream and niche consumers search with word of mouth, consumers of both types who previously searched the assortment provide recommendations. Parameter τ captures the degree of preference matching in the word of mouth process. On each recommendation draw, with probability τ ∈ (0, 1) the consumer draws a recommendation from another consumer of her own type, and with probability 1 − τ draws a recommendation randomly from the mass of consumers supplying them. The probability of a product match on each draw is therefore increasing in τ . When only mainstream consumers or only niche consumers search with word of mouth, only consumers of that same type provide recommendations. In these cases, recommendations will always yield a match.
Search is costly for consumers. Each consumer incurs a sampling cost s i on each product draw when searching the assortment, and incurs a recommendation cost w on each recommendation draw when searching with word of mouth. Sampling costs are uniformly distributed across the population independently of product preferences, so that the cost of consumer i is given by s i ∼ U [0, s]. Letting consumers dier in their search costs ensures that some will prefer to search the assortment in equilibrium while others will prefer to search with word of mouth. I assume that s ≥ u so that some consumers are unwilling to search the assortment, which simplies the analysis by avoiding corner solutions in the pricing game. I also assume consumers have the information required to form a correct expectation of the value of both search strategies: they observe mainstream population m, assortment composition a, and product prices p 1 and p 2 . Word of mouth search. Consider the problem of an unmatched consumer of type t ∈ {1, 2} in the third stage. Searching with WOM implies sequentially drawing product recommendations until a match is located. Denote the probability of locating a product match on each recommendation draw for consumers of type t by α t . A recommendation will only yield a match if drawn from another consumer of the same type. Thus α t depends on preference matching τ and the share of consumers of each type that provide recommendations, to be denoted by r t . There is always a positive mass of consumers providing recommendations, as will be shown below to be the case, so α t remains constant throughout the search. Each recommendation draw is a Bernoulli trial with the same success probability for all consumers of type t given by
The expected utility of drawing a new recommendation for an unmatched consumer of type t given α t when her preferred products are priced at p t , to be denoted by µ w t , is given by
as the consumer only purchases if a match is located but incurs recommendation cost w on every draw. Note that µ w t will dier across both consumer types due to match probability α t and prices p t .
Consumers of type t will prefer to search with WOM rather than staying out of the market if µ w t ≥ 0. Consumers searching with WOM sequentially draw recommendations until they obtain a match, which on average requires 1/α t draws for a consumer of type t. The search process nalizes once a match is located, searching for a second match cannot provide additional utility given the assumption that consumers exhibit unit demand.
Assortment search. I next turn to the second stage of the game and characterize direct search through the assortment. Searching the assortment implies sequentially drawing and sampling products, and a match is obtained when drawing a product of the consumer's own type. Denote the match probability on each assortment draw for consumers of type t by β t , where β 1 = a and β 2 = 1 − a. Given that β t remains constant throughout the search, each assortment draw is a Bernoulli trial with success probability β t for all consumers of type t.
The expected utility of a new product draw for an unmatched consumer of type t with sampling cost s i when her preferred products are priced at p t , to be denoted by µ a t,i , will be given by
given that the consumer only purchases if a match is located but incurs sampling cost s i on each draw. Note that µ a t,i will vary across types depending on assortment composition a (through β t ) and prices p t , and will also vary within types depending on consumer sampling cost s i .
The indierent participant of type t, denoted by sâ t , is strictly indierent between searching the assortment and not participating in the market. This consumer can be identied by substituting s i for sâ t in (3) and solving for µ a t,i = 0,
Consumers of type t with sampling cost s i ≤ sâ t prefer to search the assortment rather than staying out of the market. Consumers searching the assortment sequentially draw products until a match is located, which on average requires 1/β t draws for a consumer of type t. The search process nalizes once a match is located given that consumers exhibit unit demand.
Search strategy choices. I next analyze the search strategy choices of consumers in the second stage. Note that consumers of type t with low sampling costs (s i ≤ sâ t ) derive positive utility from both search strategies when µ w t ≥ 0. These consumers will choose which search strategy to pursue by comparing the expected utility of both. Consumers will perform this comparison by accounting for the fact that the expected number of draws required for a match diers between both strategies, as given by 1/β t and 1/α t . Let U a t,i = µ a t,i /β t and U w t = µ w t /α t denote the (total) expected utility of searching the assortment and searching with WOM, respectively, for a consumer of type t with search cost s i . Note that the expected utility of both search strategies is unaected by past unsuccessful draws, so a consumer who prefers to search the assortment in the second stage will never abort the search in order to search with WOM in the third stage. The indierent searcher of type t, denoted by sŵ t , obtains the same expected utility from both search strategies. The indierent searcher is identied by equating U a t,i = U
and substituting s i for sŵ t and rearranging,
The solution is given by an implicit equation because α t depends on sŵ 1 and sŵ 2 when r t < 1 (when both consumer types search with WOM). I solve the system below.
I can now characterize the search strategy choices of consumers. When µ w t ≥ 0, consumers of type t with sampling cost s i ≤ sŵ t search the assortment in the second stage and those with sampling cost s i > sŵ t search with WOM in the third stage. When µ w t < 0, consumers of type t with sampling cost s i ≤ sâ t search the assortment in the second stage and the remaining stay out of the market. 
Plugging the above expressions for r 1 and r 2 into α t in (1) for each type, and then plugging α 1 and α 2 into (6) 
Denote the equilibrium match probability of a recommendation draw for consumers of type t in market conguration c by α c t . The above solution implies that
Consider next market congurations WA and AW, where only one type searches with WOM.
Only consumers of the type searching with WOM will provide recommendations, so recommendations always yield a match. Therefore,
For types that search only the assortment in congurations WA, AW, and AA, let s c t denote the indierent participant of type t in market conguration c. The solution is given by sâ t in (4), Denition. The value of word of mouth for all consumers increases with the degree of preference matching τ and decreases with recommendation cost w.
An increase in the value of word of mouth reduces the search costs consumers incur to locate a match with recommendations.
6 If the value of word of mouth is too low, some consumers will prefer to stay out of the market instead of searching with word of mouth. I next focus on the case where consumers of both types are willing to search with word of mouth (market conguration WW), which is the case where the interactions between types is of most interest.
The left panel in Figure 1 plots the expected utility of search strategies. Utilities are plotted for the benchmark case where the assortment share and the price of both product types coincide (a = 1/2 and p 1 = p 2 ), which implies that the expected utility of searching the assortment also The preceding analysis characterizes positive word of mouth, given that consumers providing recommendations inform others about the products they matched with (products they derive utility from). This reects the observation that consumers tend to discuss the media products they enjoy, rather than the ones they do not. However, consumers could also provide recommendations about products they became informed about that did not yield a match, due to failed draws from the assortment. Both positive and negative word of mouth would then coexist in the market. In this case, when consumers providing recommendations draw randomly from their search history and all recommendations are informative about products, it can be shown that the match probability with recommendations is equivalent to that of drawing directly from the assortment, α t = β t . Word of mouth then provides more information about products with a lower match probability for the majority of consumers. This hurts mainstream consumers and benets niche consumers, so the consumer population as a whole is better o with positive word of mouth only. Assumption. When prices p 1 and p 2 are such that both market conguration WA and market conguration AW can be sustained, conguration WA prevails in the marketplace.
The assumption ensures that the equilibrium of the pricing game is unique. For certain prices the market can only sustain word of mouth by a single consumer type and this generates equilibrium multiplicity. 
where M is given by (7) .
The left panel in Figure 2 depicts the price regions of the four market congurations given the threshold prices derived above. By assumption, note that WA prevails in the central region 
2 p 2 given demands in (10) . First, inspection of price regions for congurations WW, WA, and AA, depicted in the left panel of Figure 2 , reveals that the rm can set any feasible price for one type without constraining the feasible price range for the other type (i.e., the regions are rectangular). For conguration AW, however, the rm has to choose between setting a high p 2 and setting a low p 1 (i.e., the price region is not rectangular). Inspection of π aw reveals that the rm solves this tradeo by always setting the highest feasible price p 2 .
9
I proceed to identify the rm's optimal prices within each of the four market congurations. 
Equilibrium market congurations. Given optimal prices within each market conguration, the rm will compare prots across the four congurations when choosing which prices to set. Substituting optimal prices given in (11) and (12) I characterize the rm's solution as a function of word of mouth cost w. First, consider the ranking of the four prot frontier curves in the corner cases w = 0 and w = u. When w = 0, prices in (12) (11) and (12) for each conguration c, and rm prots are decreasing in w (across congurations WW, WA, and AW) and increasing in τ (in conguration WW). Therefore, the higher the value of word of mouth for consumers, the larger the volume of sales and the higher the rm's prots.
Word of mouth has two main eects on the rm's pricing problem. First, it intensies the tradeo between price and quantity: low prices ensure word of mouth arises and this expands demand, but high prices preclude word of mouth and thereby contract demand. To understand the eect, recall that consumers who search with word of mouth are those with high sampling costs and low willingness to pay. When product prices are high, those consumers prefer to stay out of the market and do not purchase. Thus the rm's demand curve for each product type has two components, one corresponding to the low price range where word of mouth arises (high demand) and another corresponding to the high price range where it does not (low demand). Mainstream demand is plotted in the right panel in Figure 2 , and niche demand exhibits equivalent properties.
Second, the rm needs to discount prices to attract more consumer types to word of mouth.
When more than one consumer type searches with word of mouth, the exchange of recommendations across types implies that consumers incur unsuccessful recommendation draws (α t < 1).
Thus the rm has to further discount prices for both types to search with word of mouth (conguration WW) compared to the prices that can be sustained for one type alone to search with word of mouth (congurations WA and AW).
The rm's solution is plotted in Figure 3 . The left panel plots equilibrium prots and the right panel plots equilibrium prices for both product types (mainstream prices are solid, niche prices are dashed), both as a function of recommendation cost w. When w is very high, so that the value of word of mouth for consumers is low, the rm sets high prices and word of mouth does not arise in the market (conguration AA). When w is very low, so that the value of word of mouth is high, the rm prices to ensure that both types search with word of mouth (conguration WW). For interim values of w, however, the rm sets prices to foster word of mouth for one type and preclude it for the other type (congurations WA and AW). By doing so, the rm benets from some degree of word of mouth while avoiding the exchange of recommendations across types (α t = 1).
10
The rm's optimal pricing strategy is to sustain high prices while ensuring that word of mouth arises, discounting prices if necessary. When the value of word of mouth is low, this implies that the rm discounts prices for types that search with recommendations, and when the value of word of mouth is high the rm charges a premium. When both types search with word of mouth (conguration WW) the rm sets higher prices for mainstream products than for niche products.
The population advantage enjoyed by mainstream consumers implies that they incur lower search costs than niche consumers, so the rm can extract more surplus from them while still ensuring their participation.
The rm has strong incentives to increase the value of word of mouth for consumers. That is, reducing consumer search costs allows the rm to appropriate a larger share of consumer surplus, and increasing the eciency of word of mouth serves this purpose. As shown in the left panel of Figure 3 , rm prots are increasing in the value of word of mouth (prots are decreasing in w across congurations WW, WA, and AW, and increasing in τ in conguration WW). This provides a rationale for online retailers to facilitate the exchange of product recommendations on their websites and implement recommender systems that generate personalized recommendations 10 The rm prefers mainstream word of mouth when w is lower (conguration WA) and niche word of mouth when w is higher (conguration AW). A higher w implies the rm has to discount prices more aggressively to foster word of mouth. Also note that the demand expansion generated by mainstream word of mouth (D wa but mainstream consumers tend to participate more than niche consumers when searching only the assortment because there is a larger share of mainstream products (a > 1/2). These factors imply that conguration WA is generally more protable than AW for lower values of w, and vice versa. The equilibrium range over w where market conguration WA holds increases in m and decreases in a, and it can be shown that AW is prot-dominated (by WA and AA) in the corner case a = 1/2, and WA is prot-dominated (by AW) in the parameter range where m → 1/2 and a → 1.
for their customers.
I have analyzed the base scenario where the rm quotes separate prices for mainstream and niche products. If the rm commits to a single price scheme for all products, the optimal price is a population-weighted average of the prices characterized above. If the rm can price-discriminate consumers based on their search strategies, it can be shown that higher prices are charged to those searching the assortment than to those searching with word of mouth. The eect analyzed by Kuksov and Xie (2010) of providing lower prices or unexpected frills to early customers in order to prot from later customers is not present, as the utility enjoyed by consumers searching the assortment does not aect the expected utility of consumers searching with word of mouth.
The rm's solution is derived in the context of a pull-based word of mouth process, where the provision of recommendations is driven by those seeking them. In a push-based process, the provision of recommendations is driven by those possessing information, so that consumers searching the assortment provide recommendations independently of who seeks them. This aects congurations WA and AW, where the exchange of recommendations across types does not arise in the above analysis but would do so in the context of a push-based process. Unfortunately, a closed-form solution for these push-based cases cannot be derived due to the complexity of the pricing problem. However, inspection of the problem reveals that these congurations become less protable for the rm, because precluding consumers of one type from searching with word of mouth no longer reduces search costs for the other type. A push-based process therefore reduces rm prots in congurations WA and AW, reducing the equilibrium range over w where those congurations hold and expanding that of congurations WW and AA, and is less desirable for the rm than a pull-based process. Denote the equilibrium market share of products of type t in market conguration c by M S c t .
The Herndahl index is dened as
When the dierence between mainstream and niche market shares is large, M S 
Optimal assortment composition
The model assumes by construction that both mainstream and niche products are supplied, but the rm can alter their weight in the assortment or the prominence with which they are displayed.
When the eciency of word of mouth increases, as is the case in online retail, should the rm increase the weight of niche products in its assortment or promote mainstream products instead?
To answer this question, I examine the rm's optimal assortment composition when both consumer types search with word of mouth.
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I incorporate the assortment choice into the timing of the game. Consider the game where the rm chooses assortment composition a in the rst stage, sets prices p 1 and p 2 in the second stage, and consumers search the assortment and search with word of mouth in the third and fourth stages, respectively. I restrict the analysis to market conguration WW and the cases where an interior solution for a is well dened. Consumer search strategies and optimal prices carry over from the preceding analysis, so I proceed to solve the rm's assortment choice in the rst stage given the rm's prot frontier π ww * . Denote the rm's optimal assortment composition in this market conguration by a ww *
. Inspection of rst-order condition ∂π ww * /∂a = 0 identies two candidate solutions. The second-order condition reveals that only the following is a maximum,
and a ww * ∈ ( , 1) so that the rm chooses an interior solution when τ <τ wherê
Otherwise the rm chooses a corner solution because a ww * ≥ 1.
Proposition 3. The rm's optimal assortment composition when both consumer types search with word of mouth (market conguration WW) and preference matching is not very high, τ <τ , is given by a ww * . This implies that the rm over-represents niche products in the assortment relative to the consumer population's preferences when preference matching τ is low, and over-represents mainstream products when it is high. Figure 4 illustrates the result. When the degree of preference matching is low, the rm over-represents niche products in the assortment relative to the share of niche consumers in the population (a ww * < m), because reducing niche consumer search costs has the largest impact on prots. When the degree of preference matching is high, the rm chooses instead to over-represent mainstream products in the assortment (a ww * > m) because in this case reducing the search costs of mainstream consumers has the largest impact.
The result suggests that the long tail eect should not drive the rm to focus on niche products, at least not at the expense of mainstream products. Though improvements in the eciency of word of mouth increase the relative sales of niche products in the tail of the sales distribution, mainstream products in the head of the distribution still account for most of the rm's revenues.
Moreover, the search improvements that lead niche consumers to more easily locate their preferred products also reduce the downsides of promoting mainstream products. Therefore, even as the market share of niche products increases, the rm is better o promoting mainstream products instead. its storefront and product pages, which increases the value of word of mouth on its store compared to oine interactions (reduces w and increases τ ). As shown in the analysis, a consequence of this choice is lower sales concentration within the assortment compared to oine retail channels (conguration shift to WW which benets niche consumers). Amazon also chooses to promote mainstream products on its storefront (high τ suggests that high a must be optimal). The previous choices jointly contribute to lower consumer search costs, and this increases sales volume. In turn, higher sales volume and lower sales concentration provide Amazon with more consumer feedback about more products through browsing activity, ratings, and reviews (consumers of both types provide recommendations in conguration WW). This point is important, because Amazon depends on consumer feedback to feed its recommender system and supply personalized product recommendations, which closes the two loops around consumer feedback.
The two loops described are in fact virtuous cycles, because Amazon accumulates a larger stock of consumer feedback over time. Although the model is static, it should be clear that this can be a source of competitive advantage for the rm versus competitors that do not exploit word of mouth, or have been slower to do so. By iterating over these cycles Amazon accumulates a larger stock of consumer feedback, creating more value for its customers and becoming the go to place for them to discover products that match their taste. This reinforces Amazon's choices to feature product recommendations and promote mainstream products.
Amazon sets high prices to appropriate the value it generates through lower search costs.
Note however that there are two sources of tension (or negative loops) the rm needs to manage carefully. The rst one relates to pricing. The rm prices to appropriate consumer surplus, but does so ensuring that consumers with high sampling costs who rely on word of mouth remain willing 
Concluding remarks
I have analyzed the role of word of mouth for consumer product discovery in horizontally dierentiated product categories. The results can be summarized by noting that the exchange of product recommendations reduces consumer search costs, but those with less prevalent preferences and the products that appeal to them benet less due to the mechanisms underlying traditional word of mouth interactions. The online environment provides an opportunity for the rm to facilitate word of mouth and implement recommender systems, which benets all consumers but has a larger impact on those with less prevalent preferences. This increases the market share of niche products in the tail of the sales distribution, reducing the concentration of sales within the rm's assortment.
Improvements in online word of mouth therefore contribute to explain the long tail phenomenon.
Firms with lower inventory costs stand to benet the most from the long tail eect. These rms can increase the depth of their assortment beyond that of competitors, ensuring they are well positioned to serve the demand for niche products in the tail of the sales distribution. So online retailers pioneering the implementation of recommender systems have also increased the value of stocking a deeper assortment than brick and mortar competitors. The analysis suggests caution against excessive focus on niche products, however. Because the online environment facilitates product discovery and mainstream products contribute the most to sales volume, the rm is better o responding to the long tail eect by increasing the prominence of mainstream products. In fact, the rm can prot from over-representing mainstream products in the assortment relative to their potential customer base.
The implications of the ndings for competition are worth stressing. Firms with a large customer base will prot the most from online word of mouth and recommender systems. These systems benet from a large stock of consumer feedback to improve their accuracy and exhibit a learning curve to identify the preferences of new customers. Consumers will receive less accurate recommendations when switching purchases across rms and, in general, when patronizing smaller rms. Both factors suggest that the rm can exploit consumer word of mouth to grow its customer base and outperform competitors over time.
